RECENT CASES
Taxation-Exemption-Young Men's Christian Association Dormitory-[Massachusetts].-The Board of Assessors taxed a Young Men's Christian Association dormitory which occupied one-third of the Association's building, and operated at a profit.
This profit was devoted to the purposes of the corporation which lost money on the
building. The Board of Tax Appeals abated the tax, finding that the dominant purpose
of the Association in maintaining the dormitory was benevolent and charitable. Held,
the dormitory was exempt from taxation. Springfield Young Men's Christian Association v. Board of Assessors, 187 N.E. 104 (Mass. 1933).
Young Men's Christian Associations are generally exempt from taxation as charitable institutions. Little v. City of Newburyport, 21o Mass. 414, 96 N.E. 1032, Ann. Cas.
19 12D 425 (1912); Young Men's ChristianAssociation of Lincoln v. Lancaster County,
lo6 Neb. 105, 182 NAV. 593, 34 A.L.R. io6o (1921). They are not usually considered
religious organizations. Hamsher v. Hantsher, 132 Ill. 273, 23 N.E. 1123 (i89o); Young
Men's Christian Association v. New York, 113 N.Y. 187, 21 N.E. 86 (1889); cf. Commonwealth v. Young Men's ChristianAssociation, 116 Ky. 711, 76 S.W. 522, 25 Ky. L.
Rep. 940, IO5 Am. St. Rep. 234 (1o3). Their dormitories are customarily exempt.
In reSyracuse Young Men's ChristianAssociation, 126 Misc. 431, 213 N.Y.S. 35 (1925);
Young Men's ChristianAssociation'sAppeal, 15 D. & C. (Pa.) 421 (1930), even though
a profit is made. Young Women's Christian Association of Brooklyn v. New York,
137 Misc. 321, 243 N.Y.S. 294, affd. 227 App. Div. 742, 236 N.Y.S. 926, affd. 254 N.Y.
558, 173 N.E. 865 (1928); Commonwealthv. Lynchburg Young Men's ChristianAssociation, 115 Va. 748, 80 S.E. 589, 50 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1197 (1913).
The dominant use must be for charitable purposes. If part of a Young Men's Christian Association building is rented to independent businesses for profit, that part, at
least, is taxable, even though the entire income is used for the association's purposes.
Young Aen's ChristianAssociation v. Douglas County, 6o Neb. 642, 83 N.W. 924, 52
L.R.A. 123 (i9oo); Young Men's ChristianAssociation v. Keene, 70 N.H. 223, 46 Aft.
186 (i9oo). Although the association operates the business itself, and applies all the
profit to its aims, the business is not exempt when chiefly patronized by non-members.
Young Men's ChristianAssociation v. New York, 217 App. Div. 4o6, 216 N.Y.S. 248,
affd. 245 N.Y. 562, 157 N.E. 858 (1926). Profit is always an element to be considered,
but the fact that a profit is made does not determine that an institution is not charitable. CongregationalSunday School & PublishingSociety v. Board of Review, 290 Ill. Io8,
125 N.E. 7, 90 Cent. L. Jour. 74 (1919) (corporation not for profit selling religious
tracts was exempt although in some years a profit was made); School of Domestic Arts
and Science v. Carr, 322 Ill. 562, 153 N.E. 669 (1926) (restaurant used as training
school for waitresses and as outlet for products of cooking school held not taxable);
House of the Good Shepherd v. Board of Equalization, 113 Neb. 489, 203 N.W. 632 (1925)
(institution "to reform fallen women ....
to accustom them to habits of industry
and self-respect" ran a laundry and sewing business which was held exempt).
The principal case is consistent with older Massachusetts decisions and similar
cases in other jurisdictions. While the courts repeat with approval the rule requiring
strict construction of exemption statutes, only a few, notably Missouri, have shown
consistent restraint in granting exemptions. St. Louis Lodge No. 9 v. Koeln, 262 Mo.
444, 171 S.W. 329 (1914); St. Louis Young Men's ChristianAssociation v. Gehner, 329
Mo. 1007,47 S.W. (2d) 776, 81 A.L.R. 1449 (1932). Yet tax exemptions bid fair to become increasingly unpopular. Atkins, Tax Exemption-A Key to Tax Reduction,
9 Tax Magazine 19 (1931); Baker, Tax Exemption Statutes, 7 Tex. L. Rev. 50 (1928);
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Stimson, Tax Exemption in Illinois, ix Tax Magazine 17-20; 36-40 (933). This feeling is believed to have been reflected in some late decisions abolishing existing exemptions. Peopleex rel. Thompson v. Dixon Masonic Building Assn., 348 Ill. 593, 181 N.E.
434 (1932), 6 So. Cal. L. Rev. 168 (1932), expressly overrules People ex rel. Wagner v.
Freeport Masonic Temple, 347 Ill. 18o, 179 N.E. 672 (193i), which held a masonic
building exempt. A dissent in the Dixon case points out a long line of decisions contra. Alpha Tau Omega Fraternityv. Board of County Commissioners,136 Kan. 675, i8 P.
(2d) 573 (1933); 17 Minn. L. Rev. 678 (1933), held unconstitutional a statute exempting
land and buildings used exclusively by college or university societies as literary halls
or dormitories; but compare Kappa Kappa.Gamma House Assn. v. Pearcy, 92 Kan.
1020, 142 Pac. 294, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 995 (1914), which is not cited in the Alpha Tan
Omega case. Because of the state of tax collections and the oppressiveness of taxes, it
is probable that in the future the courts will severely limit exemptions.
HUBERT C. MERRICK

Torts-Breach of a Criminal Statute as a Bar to Recovery-Interpretation of
Licensing and Safety Acts-[South Dakota, Wisconsin].-Plaintiffs were towing a
thirty-foot wide airplane on a public road in violation of a statute requiring a permit to
do so. Driving in what the jury found to be a negligent manner, defendant crashed into
the plane. When the jury turned in a verdict that the plaintiff was free from contributory negligence, the trial court entered judgment in plaintiff's favor. Held, judgment affirmed. Harvison v. Herrick, 248 N.W. 205 (S.D. 1933).
Plaintiff was riding on the front fender of an automobile in violation of a statute.
The jury found the defendant negligent in driving his car against the car on which
plaintiff was riding but found that breach of the statute, which the court considered
"contributory negligence as a matter of law," had not "proximately contributed" to his
damage, the court entering judgment on the verdict for the plaintiff. Held, judgment
reversed. Wiese v. Polzer, 248 N.W.

112

(Wis. 1933).

The South Dakota decision is supported by the majority view in breach of licensingstatute cases. Armstrong v. Sellers, 18 Ala. 582, 62 So. 28 (1913); Atlantic etc. R. v. Weir,
63 Fla. 69, 58 So. 641 (1912); Brown v. Shyne, 242 N.Y. 176, 15I N.E. 197 (1926);
Southern Ry. v. Vaughn, 118 Va. 692, 88 S.E. 305 (1916). In at least two such cases,
however, courts have based liability on failure to comply with the licensing statutes.
Whipple v. Grandchamp, 261 Mass. 4o, 158 N.E. 270 (1927) and Goodwin v. Rowe, 67
Ore. 1, 135 Pac. 171 (1913). Although these cases involve breach of a statute as basis

of liability, rather than defense, they are in point for the issue remains unchanged
though the breach occurs on part of plaintiff rather than the defendant. Martin v.
Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920).
The proper way of deciding those cases is by application of the so called "legislative
purpose" formula. As has been pointed out in 27 Ill. L. R. 318 (1932), this method depends more on the way courts think the statute should operate in particular cases than
on what they believe the legislature actually had in mind in passing it. Courts usually
regard licensing statutes as either revenue measures or sanctions to compel the effective
organization of social activities.
This attitude seems justifiable in as much as these statutes do not, like most socalled safety statutes, establish a standard of conduct, the failure to observe which

